A Bankruptcy Approach to the Core Cover

M.A. Estevez Fernandez, M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro, M.A. Mosquera, E. Sanchez

    Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

    Abstract

    In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitionally stable allocations captured by an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity of the core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game. © 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)343-359
    Number of pages26
    JournalMathematical Methods of Operations Research
    Volume76
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2012

    Keywords

    • Cooperative game theory
    • Compromise admissible games
    • Bankruptcy
    • Core cover
    • Complexity

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