A Bankruptcy Approach to the Core Cover

M.A. Estevez Fernandez; M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro; M.A. Mosquera; E. Sanchez

doi:10.1007/s00186-012-0409-2

A Bankruptcy Approach to the Core Cover

M.A. Estevez Fernandez, M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro, M.A. Mosquera, E. Sanchez

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Abstract

In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitionally stable allocations captured by an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity of the core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game. © 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	343-359
Number of pages	26
Journal	Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
Volume	76
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-012-0409-2
Publication status	Published - 2012

Keywords

Cooperative game theory
Compromise admissible games
Bankruptcy
Core cover
Complexity

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10.1007/s00186-012-0409-2

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title = "A Bankruptcy Approach to the Core Cover",

abstract = "In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitionally stable allocations captured by an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity of the core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game. {\textcopyright} 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.",

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AU - Estevez Fernandez, M.A.

AU - Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G.

AU - Mosquera, M.A.

AU - Sanchez, E.

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

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AB - In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitionally stable allocations captured by an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity of the core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game. © 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

KW - Cooperative game theory

KW - Compromise admissible games

KW - Bankruptcy

KW - Core cover

KW - Complexity

U2 - 10.1007/s00186-012-0409-2

DO - 10.1007/s00186-012-0409-2

M3 - Article

SN - 1432-2994

VL - 76

SP - 343

EP - 359

JO - Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

JF - Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

IS - 3

ER -

A Bankruptcy Approach to the Core Cover

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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