A Bankruptcy Approach to the Core Cover

M.A. Estevez Fernandez, M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro, M.A. Mosquera, E. Sanchez

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In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitionally stable allocations captured by an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity of the core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game. © 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)343-359
Number of pages26
JournalMathematical Methods of Operations Research
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2012



  • Cooperative game theory
  • Compromise admissible games
  • Bankruptcy
  • Core cover
  • Complexity

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