A bargaining experiment with asymmetric institutions and preferences

Aaron Kamm, Harold Houba

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We report results from a laboratory experiment on strategic bargaining with indivisibilities studying the role of asymmetries, both in preferences and institutions. We find that subjects do not fully grasp the equilibrium effects asymmetries have on bargaining power and identify how subjects’ observed behavior systematically deviates from theoretical predictions. The deviations are especially pronounced in case of asymmetric institutions which are modelled as probabilities of being the proposer. Additionally, in contrast to previous experimental work, we observe larger than predicted proposer power since subjects frequently propose and accept their second-preferred option. Quantal response equilibrium and risk aversion explain behavior whenever probabilities are symmetric, but less so when asymmetric. We propose the ‘recognition is power’ heuristic which equates bargaining power with recognition probabilities to explain these findings.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)329-351
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume52
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2019

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bargaining power
asymmetry
experiment
laboratory experiment
heuristics
Bargaining experiment
Bargaining power
Asymmetry
Deviation
Quantal response equilibrium
Indivisibility
Prediction
Laboratory experiments
Heuristics
Risk aversion

Cite this

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A bargaining experiment with asymmetric institutions and preferences. / Kamm, Aaron; Houba, Harold.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 52, No. 2, 07.2019, p. 329-351.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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