Abstract
The writings of Kuhn and Feyerabend on incommensurability challenged the idea that science progresses towards the truth. Davidson famously criticized the notion of incommensurability, arguing that it is incoherent. Davidson's argument was in turn criticized by Kuhn and others. This article argues that, although at least some of the objections raised against Davidson's argument are formally correct, they do it very little harm. What remains of the argument once the objections have been taken account of is still quite damaging to the thesis that formerly endorsed scientific theories are incommensurable with those of today's science. © 2002 Inter-University Foundation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 157-169 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | International Studies in the Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 16 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2002 |
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