A game theoretic model of the Northwestern European electricity market: Market power and the environment

W. Lise, V.G.M. Linderhof, O.J. Kuik, C. Kemfert, R. Östling, T. Heinzow

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This paper develops a static computational game theoretic model. Illustrative results for the liberalising European electricity market are given to demonstrate the type of economic and environmental results that can be generated with the model. The model is empirically calibrated to eight Northwestern European countries, namely Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Different market structures are compared, depending on the ability of firms to exercise market power, ranging from perfect competition without market power to strategic competition where large firms exercise market power. In addition, a market power reduction policy is studied where the near-monopolies in France and Belgium are demerged into smaller firms. To analyse environmental impacts, a fixed greenhouse gas emission reduction target is introduced under different market structures. The results indicate that the effects of liberalisation depend on the resulting market structure, but that a reduction in market power of large producers may be beneficial for both the consumer (i.e. lower prices) and the environment (i.e. lower greenhouse gas permit price and lower acidifying and smog emissions). © 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2123-2136
Number of pages13
JournalEnergy Policy
Volume34
Issue number15
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006

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