A Note on "Competition Among: Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices" by Peters and Severinov

J. Albrecht; P.A. Gautier; S. Vroman

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.014

A Note on "Competition Among: Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices" by Peters and Severinov

J. Albrecht, P.A. Gautier, S. Vroman

Economics

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We consider a market in which sellers compete for buyers by advertising reserve prices for second-price auctions. Applying the limit equilibrium concept developed in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1], we show that the competitive matching equilibrium is characterized by a reserve price of zero. This corrects a result in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1]. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	389-392
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	147
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.014
Publication status	Published - 2012

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10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.014

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Cite this

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title = "A Note on {"}Competition Among: Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices{"} by Peters and Severinov",

abstract = "We consider a market in which sellers compete for buyers by advertising reserve prices for second-price auctions. Applying the limit equilibrium concept developed in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1], we show that the competitive matching equilibrium is characterized by a reserve price of zero. This corrects a result in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1]. {\textcopyright} 2011 Elsevier Inc.",

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AB - We consider a market in which sellers compete for buyers by advertising reserve prices for second-price auctions. Applying the limit equilibrium concept developed in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1], we show that the competitive matching equilibrium is characterized by a reserve price of zero. This corrects a result in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1]. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.

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