A Note on "Competition Among: Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices" by Peters and Severinov

J. Albrecht, P.A. Gautier, S. Vroman

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We consider a market in which sellers compete for buyers by advertising reserve prices for second-price auctions. Applying the limit equilibrium concept developed in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1], we show that the competitive matching equilibrium is characterized by a reserve price of zero. This corrects a result in Peters and Severinov (1997) [1]. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)389-392
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume147
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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