A note on sign symmetry for a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values

Wenzhong Li, Genjiu Xu*, René van den Brink

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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Abstract

Symmetry requires that equally productive players should get the same payoff. Sign symmetry is a considerable weakening of symmetry, which requires equally productive players' payoffs to have the same sign. In this note, we apply sign symmetry, as a substitute of symmetry to characterize a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)133-136
Number of pages4
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume50
Issue number2
Early online date21 Jan 2022
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2022

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The authors thank a reviewer for useful suggestions and comments for the improvement of this paper. This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 72071159 ), National Key R&D Program of China (Grant No. 2021YFA1000400 ), and China Scholarship Council (Grant No. 202006290157 ).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

  • Characterization
  • Cooperative games
  • Efficient, symmetric, and linear values
  • Sign symmetry

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