A physicalist reinterpretation of ‘phenomenal’ spaces

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review


This paper argues that phenomenal or internal metrical spaces are redundant posits. It is shown that we need not posit an internal space-time frame, as the physical space-time suffices to explain geometrical perception, memory and planning. More than the internal space-time frame, the idea of a phenomenal colour space has lent credibility to the idea of internal spaces. It is argued that there is no phenomenal colour space that underlies the various psychophysical colour spaces; it is parasitic upon physical and psychophysical colour spaces. The argumentation is further extended to other sensory spaces and generalised quality spaces. © Springer 2006.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)197-225
JournalPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Publication statusPublished - 2006


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