A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games

J.R. van den Brink, G. van der Laan, N. Moes

    Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

    Abstract

    In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)2737-2748
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume148
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2013

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