A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games

J.R. van den Brink; G. van der Laan; N. Moes

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.018

A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games

J.R. van den Brink, G. van der Laan, N. Moes

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	2737-2748
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	148
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.018
Publication status	Published - 2013

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10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.018

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title = "A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games",

abstract = "In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph. {\textcopyright} 2013 Elsevier Inc.",

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AB - In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.

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DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.018

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