TY - JOUR
T1 - A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
AU - van den Brink, J.R.
AU - van der Laan, G.
AU - Moes, N.
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.
AB - In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84888052258
UR - https://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84888052258&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.018
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.018
M3 - Article
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 148
SP - 2737
EP - 2748
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 6
ER -
