Access to critical medicines: When are compulsory licenses effective in price negotiations?

Shyama V. Ramani*, Eduardo Urias

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

    Abstract

    Governments of developing countries can be in a vulnerable position with respect to patent protected drugs supplied by foreign firms, if the technology cannot be licensed or independently developed by local firms. In such instances, one possible solution is to negotiate for a price-drop with the patent holder in lieu of issuing a compulsory license. The present paper develops a game theoretic model of such bargaining and shows that while compulsory licenses do not occur under complete information, they can be issued under incomplete information. The model is tested against real episodes of compulsory licenses to derive policy insight.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)75-83
    Number of pages9
    JournalSocial Science and Medicine
    Volume135
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2015

    Keywords

    • Access to medicines
    • Compulsory licensing
    • IPR
    • Non-cooperative game
    • Price negotiation
    • TRIPS

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Access to critical medicines: When are compulsory licenses effective in price negotiations?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this