Airport peak-load pricing revisited: The case of peak and uniform tolls

A.I. Czerny, A. Zhang

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This paper develops a two-period model with peak/off-peak demands that incorporates three types of passengers: (1) passengers who are scheduled for peak departure and depart during the peak period, (2) passengers who are scheduled for peak departure but depart during the off-peak period because of congestion, and (3) passengers who are scheduled for off-peak departure. An increase in peak supply may turn own type-1 passengers into type-2 passengers, which is called self-imposed schedule delay. Our main result is that carriers with market power internalize self-imposed schedule delay costs. The investigation of a uniform-toll regime reveals that the welfare-optimal uniform toll corrects for external schedule delay only if schedule delay cost is sufficiently high. © 2013 Elsevier Ltd.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)90-101
JournalEconomics of Transportation
Volume3
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

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Airports
airport
pricing
market power
costs
Costs
welfare
regime
supply
Schedule delay
Peak-load pricing

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Czerny, A.I. ; Zhang, A. / Airport peak-load pricing revisited: The case of peak and uniform tolls. In: Economics of Transportation. 2014 ; Vol. 3, No. 1. pp. 90-101.
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Airport peak-load pricing revisited: The case of peak and uniform tolls. / Czerny, A.I.; Zhang, A.

In: Economics of Transportation, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2014, p. 90-101.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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