An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value for Cooperative Games on Antimatroids

E. Algaba, J.M. Bilbao, J.R. van den Brink, A. Jimenez-Losada

    Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

    Abstract

    Cooperative games on antimatroids are cooperative games in which coalition formation is restricted by a combinatorial structure which generalizes permission structures. These games group several well-known families of games which have important applications in economics and politics. The current paper establishes axioms that determine the restricted Banzhaf value for cooperative games on antimatroids. The set of given axioms generalizes the axiomatizations given for the Banzhaf permission values. We also give an axomatization of the restricted Banzhaf value for the smaller class of poset antimatroids. Finally, we apply the above results to auction situations. © Springer-Verlag 2004.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)147-166
    Number of pages19
    JournalMathematical Methods of Operations Research
    Volume59
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2004

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