An Epistemic Argument for Tolerance

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In this paper I first take a critical look at Grube’s allegiance to the idea that bivalence should be rejected as it can serve the cause of religious toleration. I argue that bivalence is not what Grube says it is, and that rejection of bivalence comes at a very high price that we should not be willing to pay. Next I analyze Grube’s argument for religious toleration – an argument that does not involve the rejection of bivalence. I argue that the argument is unconvincing because there exists no relation between epistemic justification and toleration. (I also note problems with the notion of ‘justification’ as used by Grube.)
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPhilosophical Perspectives on Religious Diversity
EditorsDirk-Martin Grube, Walter van Herck
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9781315102139
ISBN (Print)9781138104624, 9780367891114
Publication statusPublished - 2018


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