An Online Market Mechanism for Edge Emergency Demand Response via Cloudlet Control

Shutong Chen, Lei Jiao, Lin Wang, Fangming Liu

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

The computing frontier is moving from centralized mega datacenters towards distributed cloudlets at the network edge. We argue that cloudlets are well-suited for participation in Emergency Demand Response (EDR) programs due to their enormous energy consumption and flexible workload distribution, while existing EDR mechanisms for clouds and colocation datacenters are not suitable for cloudlets. We propose a novel online market mechanism, EdgeEDR, to incentivize cloudlets to participate in EDR, featuring multiple cloudlet-specific designs. At a high level, we observe that cloudlet operators can dynamically switch on/off entire cloudlets to compensate for the energy reduction required by the power grid. We formulate a long-term social cost minimization problem and decompose it into a series of one-round procurement auctions. In each auction instance, we propose to let the cloudlet tenants bid with cost functions of their service quality degradation tolerance, and let the cloudlet operator choose the service quality, allocate the workload, and shut down the cloudlets. Via rigorous analysis, we exhibit that our bidding policy is individually rational and truthful; our workload distribution algorithm has near-optimal performance in each auction; and our overall online algorithm achieves a provable competitive ratio. We further confirm the performance of our mechanism through extensive trace-driven simulations.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationINFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages2566-2574
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781728105154
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2019
Event2019 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2019 - Paris, France
Duration: 29 Apr 20192 May 2019

Publication series

NameIEEE Conference Proceedings
ISSN (Print)1062-922X

Conference

Conference2019 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2019
CountryFrance
CityParis
Period29/04/192/05/19

Fingerprint

Cost functions
Quality of service
Energy utilization
Switches
Degradation
Costs

Cite this

Chen, S., Jiao, L., Wang, L., & Liu, F. (2019). An Online Market Mechanism for Edge Emergency Demand Response via Cloudlet Control. In INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (pp. 2566-2574). [8737574] (IEEE Conference Proceedings). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2019.8737574
Chen, Shutong ; Jiao, Lei ; Wang, Lin ; Liu, Fangming. / An Online Market Mechanism for Edge Emergency Demand Response via Cloudlet Control. INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. pp. 2566-2574 (IEEE Conference Proceedings).
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Chen, S, Jiao, L, Wang, L & Liu, F 2019, An Online Market Mechanism for Edge Emergency Demand Response via Cloudlet Control. in INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications., 8737574, IEEE Conference Proceedings, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 2566-2574, 2019 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2019, Paris, France, 29/04/19. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2019.8737574

An Online Market Mechanism for Edge Emergency Demand Response via Cloudlet Control. / Chen, Shutong; Jiao, Lei; Wang, Lin; Liu, Fangming.

INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. p. 2566-2574 8737574 (IEEE Conference Proceedings).

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

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Chen S, Jiao L, Wang L, Liu F. An Online Market Mechanism for Edge Emergency Demand Response via Cloudlet Control. In INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2019. p. 2566-2574. 8737574. (IEEE Conference Proceedings). https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2019.8737574