An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure

J.R. van den Brink, A. Khmelnitskaya, G. van der Laan

    Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

    Abstract

    We introduce an Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure, which is a structure where the players are partitioned into a coalition structure such that there exists restricted communication between as well as within the a priori unions of the coalition structure. Both types of communication restrictions are modeled by an undirected communication graph. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the new value using an efficiency, two types of fairness (one for each level of the communication structure), and a new type of axiom, called fair distribution of the surplus within unions, which compares the effect of replacing a union in the coalition structure by one of its maximal connected components on the payoffs of these components. The relevance of the new value is illustrated by an example. We also show that for particular two-level communication structures the Owen value and the Aumann–Drèze value for games with coalition structure, the Myerson value for communication graph games, and the equal surplus division solution appear as special cases of this new value.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)179-198
    JournalAnnals of Operations Research
    Volume243
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2016

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