Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 179-198 |
| Journal | Annals of Operations Research |
| Volume | 243 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2016 |
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An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure. / van den Brink, J.R.; Khmelnitskaya, A.; van der Laan, G.
In: Annals of Operations Research, Vol. 243, No. 1, 2016, p. 179-198.Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure
AU - van den Brink, J.R.
AU - Khmelnitskaya, A.
AU - van der Laan, G.
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - We introduce an Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure, which is a structure where the players are partitioned into a coalition structure such that there exists restricted communication between as well as within the a priori unions of the coalition structure. Both types of communication restrictions are modeled by an undirected communication graph. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the new value using an efficiency, two types of fairness (one for each level of the communication structure), and a new type of axiom, called fair distribution of the surplus within unions, which compares the effect of replacing a union in the coalition structure by one of its maximal connected components on the payoffs of these components. The relevance of the new value is illustrated by an example. We also show that for particular two-level communication structures the Owen value and the Aumann–Drèze value for games with coalition structure, the Myerson value for communication graph games, and the equal surplus division solution appear as special cases of this new value.
AB - We introduce an Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure, which is a structure where the players are partitioned into a coalition structure such that there exists restricted communication between as well as within the a priori unions of the coalition structure. Both types of communication restrictions are modeled by an undirected communication graph. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the new value using an efficiency, two types of fairness (one for each level of the communication structure), and a new type of axiom, called fair distribution of the surplus within unions, which compares the effect of replacing a union in the coalition structure by one of its maximal connected components on the payoffs of these components. The relevance of the new value is illustrated by an example. We also show that for particular two-level communication structures the Owen value and the Aumann–Drèze value for games with coalition structure, the Myerson value for communication graph games, and the equal surplus division solution appear as special cases of this new value.
U2 - 10.1007/s10479-015-1808-6
DO - 10.1007/s10479-015-1808-6
M3 - Article
VL - 243
SP - 179
EP - 198
JO - Annals of Operations Research
JF - Annals of Operations Research
SN - 0254-5330
IS - 1
ER -