Abstract
Large-scale load-altering attacks (LAAs) are known to severely disrupt power grid operations by manipulating several internet-of-things (IoT)-enabled load devices. In this work, we analyze power grid cascading failures induced by such attacks. The inherent security features in power grids such as the N-1 design philosophy dictate LAAs that can trigger cascading failures are rare events. We overcome the challenge of efficiently sampling critical LAAs scenarios for a wide range of attack parameters by using the so-called 'skipping sampler' algorithm. We conduct extensive simulations using a three-area IEEE-39 bus system and provide several novel insights into the composition of cascades due to LAAs. Our results highlight the particular risks to modern power systems posed by strategically designed coordinated LAAs that exploit their structural and real-time operating characteristics.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | 2023 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm) |
Subtitle of host publication | [Proceedings] |
Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
Number of pages | 6 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781665455565 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781665455572 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2023 |
Event | 14th IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2023 - Glasgow, United Kingdom Duration: 31 Oct 2023 → 3 Nov 2023 |
Conference
Conference | 14th IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2023 |
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Country/Territory | United Kingdom |
City | Glasgow |
Period | 31/10/23 → 3/11/23 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2023 IEEE.
Keywords
- cascading failures
- Load-altering attacks
- N-l secure
- rareevent sampling