Anticompetitive pharmaceutical patent settlements: the EU cases on pay-for-delay

Wolf Sauter, Jotte Mulder

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingChapterAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This chapter looks at the case law on (reverse) patent settlement and pay for delay regarding pharmaceuticals at EU level, based on the antitrust cases pursued by the European Commission and the relevant decisions by the CJEU. The pay for delay cases are at the interstices of patent protection and competition law, and demonstrate the parallel applicability of these two legal systems. Until recently they formed the core focus of the Commission's enforcement activity concerning pharmaceuticals. Following appeals before the General Court in Lundbeck and Servier, the preliminary ruling in Paroxetine set out the CJEU's approach to the questions when reverse payments are objectionable and when by object infringements are concerned. This approach was confirmed in the ruling on the further appeal in Lundbeck. The chapter looks forward to the further appeal in Servier, which is likely to be the Court's final word on this type of infringement.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEU competition law and pharmaceuticals
EditorsWolf Sauter, Marcel Canoy, Jotte Mulder
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Chapter6
Pages79-96
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)9781802204414
ISBN (Print)9781802204407
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2022

Publication series

NameNew Horizons in Competition Law and Economics
PublisherEdward Elgar

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