Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance

Pierre Koning; Maarten Lindeboom; Mathilde Godard

doi:10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1

Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance

Pierre Koning, Maarten Lindeboom, Mathilde Godard

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) program induced by a nationwide reform. The drastic “Gatekeeper Protocol” increased application costs and revealed more information about individuals’ ability to work. Discontinuity-in-Time regressions on administrative data show substantial declines in DI application rates (40% in one year) following the reform, particularly among difficult-to-verify impairments and less severe health disorders. Individuals that were deterred from applying had worse health and worked less than never-applicants. Changes in average health conditions of awardees were almost fully driven by selfscreening and work resumption during the DI sick-pay period.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1353-1386
Journal	Journal of Human Resources
Volume	59
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.1120-11323R1
Publication status	Published - 2024

Funding

Mathilde Godard is CNRS researcher at Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, CNRS, LEDa ([email protected]). Pierre Koning is economics professor at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, IZA, and TI. Maarten Lindeboom is economics professor at the Vrije Universiteit, IZA, TI, the Centre for Health Economics, and Monash University. The authors thank Patrick Hullegie for his initial work on the data, as well as Christopher Cronin, Eric French, Izabela Jelovac, Helge Liebert, Nicole Maestas, Owen O’Donell, Philip Oreopoulos, Nigel Rice, Jonathan Skinner, Joachim Winter, Joe Doyle, Arthur Schram, Enrica Croda, Agar Brugiavini, Yue Li, and participants of the NBER/CEPRA workshop on Aging and Health, the CRES-UPF Workshop on Disability Topics in Barcelona, the 2017 Essen Health Conference, and seminars at PSE, York, Florence, Venice, Rome, Melbourne, Nantes, and Brussels for helpful comments and suggestions. Mathilde Godard acknowledges the support of the EU under a Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship for Career Development, as well as financial support from Health

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European Commission

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Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance

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