Abstract
Recently, Del Ratzsch proposed a new version of the design argument. He argues that belief in a designer is often formed non-inferentially, much like perceptual beliefs, rather than formed by explicit reasoning. Ratzsch traces his argument back to Thomas Reid (1710-1796) who argues that beliefs formed in this way are also justified. In this paper, I investigate whether design beliefs that are formed in this way can be regarded as knowledge. For this purpose, I look closer to recent scientific study of how design beliefs are formed. I argue that the science strongly suggest that people easily form false beliefs. As a result, design beliefs can only constitute knowledge if subjects have additional reasons or evidence for design.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 8(1) |
Pages (from-to) | 75-83 |
Journal | Studia Humana |
Volume | 8 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2019 |
Keywords
- Safety condition for knowledge
- epistemology
- cognitive science of religion