Assessing the Effects of Disability Insurance Experience Rating. The Case of The Netherlands

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Experience-rated disability insurance (DI) premiums are often advocated as a means to stimulate firms to reduce DI inflow and increase DI outflow. To assess the size of these intended effects of experience rating, this study provides an empirical analysis of the effects of DI experience rating in The Netherlands. We use a difference-in-difference approach with administrative matched firm- and worker data that exploits the removal of experience rating for small firms in 2003 and 2004. According to our results, removing experience rating caused an increase of DI inflow of about 7% for small firms, while DI outflow decreased by 12% as a result of the reform. We argue that these effects were largely confined to the first year of DI benefit receipt.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)304-317
JournalLabour Economics
Volume41
Issue numberAugust
Early online date13 May 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

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The Netherlands
Disability insurance
Experience rating
Small firms
Empirical analysis
Difference-in-differences
Insurance premium
Workers

Cite this

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title = "Assessing the Effects of Disability Insurance Experience Rating. The Case of The Netherlands",
abstract = "Experience-rated disability insurance (DI) premiums are often advocated as a means to stimulate firms to reduce DI inflow and increase DI outflow. To assess the size of these intended effects of experience rating, this study provides an empirical analysis of the effects of DI experience rating in The Netherlands. We use a difference-in-difference approach with administrative matched firm- and worker data that exploits the removal of experience rating for small firms in 2003 and 2004. According to our results, removing experience rating caused an increase of DI inflow of about 7{\%} for small firms, while DI outflow decreased by 12{\%} as a result of the reform. We argue that these effects were largely confined to the first year of DI benefit receipt.",
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Assessing the Effects of Disability Insurance Experience Rating. The Case of The Netherlands. / Koning, P.W.C.; de Groot, N.

In: Labour Economics, Vol. 41, No. August, 2016, p. 304-317.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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AB - Experience-rated disability insurance (DI) premiums are often advocated as a means to stimulate firms to reduce DI inflow and increase DI outflow. To assess the size of these intended effects of experience rating, this study provides an empirical analysis of the effects of DI experience rating in The Netherlands. We use a difference-in-difference approach with administrative matched firm- and worker data that exploits the removal of experience rating for small firms in 2003 and 2004. According to our results, removing experience rating caused an increase of DI inflow of about 7% for small firms, while DI outflow decreased by 12% as a result of the reform. We argue that these effects were largely confined to the first year of DI benefit receipt.

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