Abstract
We analyze a legal situation in which a plaintiff suffers the total damage of the cumulative injury that is caused by multiple sequences of tortfeasors’ wrongful acts. This liability situation is modeled by a tuple consisting of a rooted-tree network of causation of the injury, and a list of marginal damages. The problem is to determine how to share the total damage among the tortfeasors in such situations. A rule is a mapping that associates with each liability problem a list of payments to be made by the tortfeasors to pay for the plaintiff’s harm. We axiomatize two rules that are obtained as the Nucleolus and the Shapley value, respectively, of a coalitional game with tortfeasors as players. The axioms involved in these axiomatizations are derived from the legal concept of tort law.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 229-258 |
| Number of pages | 30 |
| Journal | Economic Theory |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 17 Jan 2022 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
Funding
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| Japan Society for the Promotion of Science | JSPS KAKENHI Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B), Project #17K13751 |
Keywords
- Axiomatizations
- Liability problems
- Nucleolus
- Rooted-tree networks
- Shapley value
- Tort law