TY - JOUR
T1 - Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values
AU - van den Brink, J.R.
AU - Funaki, Y.
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - In this paper we introduce discounting in the bidding mechanism of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J Econ Theory 100:274–294, 2001) who implemented the Shapley value for cooperative transferable utility games. This modification of the mechanism yields the corresponding discounted Shapley value as the payoff distribution in every subgame perfect equilibrium. The class of discounted Shapley values contains the Shapley value and equal division solution as its extreme cases. Interestingly, we obtain axiomatizations of each solution in this class by generalizing the null player property (of the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (of the equal division solution) to the so-called δ-reducing player property.
AB - In this paper we introduce discounting in the bidding mechanism of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J Econ Theory 100:274–294, 2001) who implemented the Shapley value for cooperative transferable utility games. This modification of the mechanism yields the corresponding discounted Shapley value as the payoff distribution in every subgame perfect equilibrium. The class of discounted Shapley values contains the Shapley value and equal division solution as its extreme cases. Interestingly, we obtain axiomatizations of each solution in this class by generalizing the null player property (of the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (of the equal division solution) to the so-called δ-reducing player property.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84942196080
UR - https://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84942196080&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00355-015-0899-y
DO - 10.1007/s00355-015-0899-y
M3 - Article
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 45
SP - 329
EP - 344
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 2
ER -
