Boolean negotiation games

Nils Bulling, Koen V. Hindriks*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We propose Boolean Negotiation Games, a computationally grounded model to investigate strategic aspects of negotiations. Our model is inspired by the popular Boolean Game framework and Rubinstein’s bargaining model of alternating offers. We analyse restrictions on negotiation protocols and investigate properties of agreements. We propose and investigate protocols that do not allow repeating offers. In the context of Boolean Games we then naturally obtain finite games, which arise in many practical negotiation contexts.We show that Boolean negotiation games (BNGs) can yield agreements which are more beneficial than the stable solutions (i.e. Nash equilibria) of the underlying Boolean game, and propose an algorithm to compute stable negotiation strategies.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationConflict Resolution in Decision Making - 2nd International Workshop, COREDEMA 2016, Revised Selected Papers
EditorsTim Baarslag, Catholijn M. Jonker, Vicente Julian, Enrico Gerding, Reyhan Aydogan, Victor Sanchez-Anguix
PublisherSpringer/Verlag
Pages1-18
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)9783319572840
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2017
Externally publishedYes
Event2nd International Workshop on Conflict Resolution in Decision Making, COREDEMA 2016 - The Hague, Netherlands
Duration: 29 Aug 201630 Aug 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10238 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference2nd International Workshop on Conflict Resolution in Decision Making, COREDEMA 2016
Country/TerritoryNetherlands
CityThe Hague
Period29/08/1630/08/16

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