Boolean negotiation games

Nils Bulling, Koen V. Hindriks

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review


We propose a new strategic model of negotiation, called Boolean negotiation games. Our model is inspired by Boolean games and the alternating offers model of bargaining. It offers a computationally grounded model for studying properties of negotiation protocols in a qualitative setting. Boolean negotiation games can yield agreements that are more beneficial than stable solutions (Nash equilibria) of the underlying Boolean game.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
EditorsGal A. Kaminka, Frank Dignum, Eyke Hullermeier, Paolo Bouquet, Virginia Dignum, Maria Fox, Frank van Harmelen
PublisherIOS Press
Number of pages2
ISBN (Electronic)9781614996712
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2016
Externally publishedYes
Event22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2016 - The Hague, Netherlands
Duration: 29 Aug 20162 Sept 2016

Publication series

NameFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
ISSN (Print)0922-6389


Conference22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2016
CityThe Hague


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