Chinese multinationals and Europe’s geoeconomic turn: The de‐globalization of the Chinese ICT and automotive industry?

Amid increasing geopolitical tensions between Western powers and China over the alleged state‐capitalist nature of Chinese corporate internationalization, European governments have introduced a set of political measures tightening their trade and investment regimes on grounds of national security and economic competitiveness. This article analyzes how this “geoeconomic turn” in Europe affected the internationalization of (state‐backed) Chinese firms into Europe and hence the establishment of Sino‐European corporate relations. With a focus on the Chinese ICT and automotive industries, we zoom in on corporate internationalization by distinguishing two modes: (a) outward foreign direct investments (greenfield investments and mergers and acquisitions) and (b) the formation of collaborative ties (strategic alliances and joint ventures) with European companies—a hitherto underexplored form of Sino‐European corporate relations. Our analysis is predicated on a comprehensive dataset consolidating information on both modes of internationalization for the period 2000–2023. We show that, in relation to investment numbers, Chinese companies continue to expand into Europe, even if values are decreasing. We also find that the formation of collaborative ties (strategic alliances and joint ventures) has not halted but increased in the wake of Europe’s geoeconomic turn, indicating a further intensification of Sino‐European corporate relations, though under the radar of tightening investment policies and mechanisms. When unpacking the variegated impact of the geoeconomic turn on Chinese companies’ internationalization strategies in Europe, our study also finds, however, that its ramifications vary substantively—not only per sector but also among companies exposed to varying degrees of party‐state permeation. Applying a novel fine‐grained measure to party‐state permeation, the article shows that the geoeconomic turn seems to have affected predominantly those leading Chinese firms with a high party‐state exposure.