TY - JOUR
T1 - Cleaning a river: an analysis of voluntary joint action
AU - Gengenbach, M.
AU - Weikard, H.P.
AU - Ansink, E.
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - River pollution creates negative externalities to downstream water users. In this paper, we analyze how voluntary joint action of water users can improve pollution abatement when optimal treatment cannot be enforced. We model a transboundary pollution game with a unidirectional pollutant flow. Players are identical except for their location along the river. We find that, surprisingly, the location of coalition members has no impact on coalition stability. Location does, however, affect overall welfare. The more upstream the members of the coalition are, the higher is the overall welfare because the positive externalities of cleaning accrue to a larger number of downstream water users. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
AB - River pollution creates negative externalities to downstream water users. In this paper, we analyze how voluntary joint action of water users can improve pollution abatement when optimal treatment cannot be enforced. We model a transboundary pollution game with a unidirectional pollutant flow. Players are identical except for their location along the river. We find that, surprisingly, the location of coalition members has no impact on coalition stability. Location does, however, affect overall welfare. The more upstream the members of the coalition are, the higher is the overall welfare because the positive externalities of cleaning accrue to a larger number of downstream water users. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
U2 - 10.1111/j.1939-7445.2010.00074.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1939-7445.2010.00074.x
M3 - Article
SN - 0890-8575
VL - 23
SP - 565
EP - 590
JO - Natural Resource Modeling
JF - Natural Resource Modeling
IS - 4
ER -