Climate change and the stability of water allocation agreements

Erik Ansink, Arjan Ruijs

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper we assess the stability of water allocation agreements using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that a decrease in mean river flow decreases the stability of an agreement, while an increased variance can have a positive or a negative effect on stability. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules. These results hold for both constant and flexible non-water transfers.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)249-266
Number of pages18
JournalEnvironmental and Resource Economics
Volume41
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2008

Fingerprint

Climate change
climate change
Water
river flow
water
Rivers
water use
river water
allocation
Water allocation
effect
Sharing rule

Keywords

  • Climate change
  • Game theory
  • Stability
  • Water allocation

Cite this

@article{37bf80fea383485182144c505c51fa11,
title = "Climate change and the stability of water allocation agreements",
abstract = "We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper we assess the stability of water allocation agreements using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that a decrease in mean river flow decreases the stability of an agreement, while an increased variance can have a positive or a negative effect on stability. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules. These results hold for both constant and flexible non-water transfers.",
keywords = "Climate change, Game theory, Stability, Water allocation",
author = "Erik Ansink and Arjan Ruijs",
year = "2008",
month = "10",
doi = "10.1007/s10640-008-9190-3",
language = "English",
volume = "41",
pages = "249--266",
journal = "Environmental and Resource Economics",
issn = "0924-6460",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "2",

}

Climate change and the stability of water allocation agreements. / Ansink, Erik; Ruijs, Arjan.

In: Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 41, No. 2, 10.2008, p. 249-266.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Climate change and the stability of water allocation agreements

AU - Ansink, Erik

AU - Ruijs, Arjan

PY - 2008/10

Y1 - 2008/10

N2 - We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper we assess the stability of water allocation agreements using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that a decrease in mean river flow decreases the stability of an agreement, while an increased variance can have a positive or a negative effect on stability. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules. These results hold for both constant and flexible non-water transfers.

AB - We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper we assess the stability of water allocation agreements using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that a decrease in mean river flow decreases the stability of an agreement, while an increased variance can have a positive or a negative effect on stability. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules. These results hold for both constant and flexible non-water transfers.

KW - Climate change

KW - Game theory

KW - Stability

KW - Water allocation

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=52549111589&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10640-008-9190-3

DO - 10.1007/s10640-008-9190-3

M3 - Article

VL - 41

SP - 249

EP - 266

JO - Environmental and Resource Economics

JF - Environmental and Resource Economics

SN - 0924-6460

IS - 2

ER -