Collaborative shipping under information distortion

Silvia Valeria Padilla Tinoco, Eirini Spiliotopoulou, Robert Boute*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review


We examine the incentives for a firm to provide non-truthful demand information under a two-company shipping collaboration. We analyze how distorted demand reporting impacts the logistics costs of each individual company in the collaboration and how this impacts the stability of the collaboration agreement. We find that when the cost allocation proportions are agreed ex-ante based on the reported demand, companies have an incentive to deflate their demand when simple cost allocation rules are used; only when the Shapley value is in place, companies have no incentive to distort their demand information. When the cost allocation proportions are calculated ex-post, based on realized demand, the truth-telling strategy is dominant when the Shapley value or an allocation rule based on the demand or stand-alone costs is in place.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain
Subtitle of host publication6th International Conference, ILS 2016, Revised Selected Papers
EditorsC. Temponi, N. Vandaele
Number of pages13
ISBN (Electronic)9783319737584
ISBN (Print)9783319737577
Publication statusPublished - 2018
Event6th International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain, ILS 2016 - Bordeaux, France
Duration: 1 Jun 20164 Jun 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Business Information Processing
ISSN (Print)1865-1348


Conference6th International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain, ILS 2016

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