Collaborative shipping under information distortion

Silvia Valeria Padilla Tinoco, Eirini Spiliotopoulou, Robert Boute

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We examine the incentives for a firm to provide non-truthful demand information under a two-company shipping collaboration. We analyze how distorted demand reporting impacts the logistics costs of each individual company in the collaboration and how this impacts the stability of the collaboration agreement. We find that when the cost allocation proportions are agreed ex-ante based on the reported demand, companies have an incentive to deflate their demand when simple cost allocation rules are used; only when the Shapley value is in place, companies have no incentive to distort their demand information. When the cost allocation proportions are calculated ex-post, based on realized demand, the truth-telling strategy is dominant when the Shapley value or an allocation rule based on the demand or stand-alone costs is in place.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain
Subtitle of host publication6th International Conference, ILS 2016, Revised Selected Papers
EditorsC. Temponi, N. Vandaele
PublisherSpringer/Verlag
Pages125-137
Number of pages13
Volume262
ISBN (Electronic)9783319737584
ISBN (Print)9783319737577
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018
Event6th International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain, ILS 2016 - Bordeaux, France
Duration: 1 Jun 20164 Jun 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Business Information Processing
Volume262
ISSN (Print)1865-1348

Conference

Conference6th International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain, ILS 2016
CountryFrance
CityBordeaux
Period1/06/164/06/16

Fingerprint

Freight transportation
Cost Allocation
Costs
Incentives
Shapley Value
Industry
Proportion
Logistics
Demand
Shipping
Information distortion
Collaboration
Cost allocation

Cite this

Padilla Tinoco, S. V., Spiliotopoulou, E., & Boute, R. (2018). Collaborative shipping under information distortion. In C. Temponi, & N. Vandaele (Eds.), Information Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain: 6th International Conference, ILS 2016, Revised Selected Papers (Vol. 262, pp. 125-137). (Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing; Vol. 262). Springer/Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73758-4_9
Padilla Tinoco, Silvia Valeria ; Spiliotopoulou, Eirini ; Boute, Robert. / Collaborative shipping under information distortion. Information Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain: 6th International Conference, ILS 2016, Revised Selected Papers. editor / C. Temponi ; N. Vandaele. Vol. 262 Springer/Verlag, 2018. pp. 125-137 (Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing).
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Padilla Tinoco, SV, Spiliotopoulou, E & Boute, R 2018, Collaborative shipping under information distortion. in C Temponi & N Vandaele (eds), Information Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain: 6th International Conference, ILS 2016, Revised Selected Papers. vol. 262, Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol. 262, Springer/Verlag, pp. 125-137, 6th International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain, ILS 2016, Bordeaux, France, 1/06/16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73758-4_9

Collaborative shipping under information distortion. / Padilla Tinoco, Silvia Valeria; Spiliotopoulou, Eirini; Boute, Robert.

Information Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain: 6th International Conference, ILS 2016, Revised Selected Papers. ed. / C. Temponi; N. Vandaele. Vol. 262 Springer/Verlag, 2018. p. 125-137 (Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing; Vol. 262).

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

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Padilla Tinoco SV, Spiliotopoulou E, Boute R. Collaborative shipping under information distortion. In Temponi C, Vandaele N, editors, Information Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain: 6th International Conference, ILS 2016, Revised Selected Papers. Vol. 262. Springer/Verlag. 2018. p. 125-137. (Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73758-4_9