Abstract
It is largely assumed that conceptual engineering is essentially about revising, introducing, or eliminating representational devices, in particular the intension and extension of words and concepts. However, tying conceptual engineering too closely to representations is risky. Not everyone endorses the notion of representation as theoretically helpful or even real. Not everyone thinks that concepts or meanings should be understood in terms of the notion of representation. Does this mean that conceptual engineering is not interesting or relevant for these skeptics? In this paper, I motivate and propose a non-representationalist construal of conceptual engineering. I argue that conceptual engineers can be understood as primarily engineering linguistic entitlements and commitments rather than representational devices. Note that this account is non-representationalist, but explicitly not anti-representationalist. Representations may play a significant role when it comes to justifying and completing commitment engineering projects.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 13035-13052 |
Journal | Synthese |
Volume | 199 |
Issue number | 5-6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2021 |
Externally published | Yes |
Funding
This work is part of the research programme Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies, which is funded through the Gravitation programme of the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO Grant Number 024.004.031). It has also been funded by Ruhr University Research School PLUS, funded by Germany’s Excellence Initiative [DFG GSC 98/3].
Funders | Funder number |
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Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science | |
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft | GSC 98/3 |
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek | 024.004.031 |
Research School, Ruhr University Bochum |