Abstract
The bank recovery and resolution directive (BRRD) regulates the bail-in hierarchy to resolve distressed banks in the European Union (EU). Using the staggered BRRD implementation across 15 member states, we identify banks’ capital cost responses and subsequent pass-through to borrowers towards surprise elements due to national transposition details. Average bank capital costs increase heterogeneously across countries with strongest funding cost hikes observed for banks located in GIIPS and non-EMU countries. Only banks in core E(M)U countries that exhibit higher funding costs increase credit spreads for corporate borrowers and contract credit supply. Tighter credit conditions are only passed on to more levered and less profitable firms. On balance, the national implementation of BRRD appears to have strengthened financial system resilience without a pervasive hike in borrowing costs.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 104229 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1-22 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | European Economic Review |
| Volume | 148 |
| Early online date | 16 Jul 2022 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sept 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:Lena Tonzer has benefited from funding by the European Social Fund (ESF) . The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Danmarks Nationalbank. All errors and inconsistencies are solely our own responsibility.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 The Author(s)
Funding
Lena Tonzer has benefited from funding by the European Social Fund (ESF) . The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Danmarks Nationalbank. All errors and inconsistencies are solely our own responsibility.
Keywords
- Bail-in
- Bank funding costs
- Corporate sector transmission
- European Banking Union
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