Compromise and virtue in democratic politics: A neo-Aristotelian view

In recent years, moral and political philosophers have paid increasing attention to the ethics of compromise. Their discussions, however, mostly concern the question whether particular compromises are justifiable or not, rather than the question how one can make compromises well. But since compromises must occasionally be made in (public) life, it is an important question how one can compromise ‘with character’, that is to say, virtuously. Hence, this paper discusses the way in which virtue ethics can be used to assess (and improve) the moral quality of processes of compromise-making and their outcomes. First, it is argued why the standard framework of ethical thinking about compromises is helpful but insufficient. Next, the outlines of a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics of compromise-making are presented. And finally the potential and limitations of this approach are discussed, together with some remaining challenges for those
who wish to elaborate it further.