This paper examines two strands of literature regarding economic models of cooperation. First, payoff transformation theories assume that people may not be exclusively motivated by self-interest, but also care about equality and fairness. Second, team reasoning theorists assume that people might reason from the perspective of the team, rather than an individualistic perspective. Can these two theories be unified? In contrast to the consensus among team reasoning theorists, I argue that team reasoning can be viewed as a particular type of payoff transformation. However, I also demonstrate that many payoff transformations yield actions that team reasoning rules out.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
The author would like to thank the audience at the University of Tampere and would especially like to thank Jan Broersen, Nathalie Gold, Raul Hakli, Jurgis Karpus, Werner Raub, Robert Sugden and Allard Tamminga for helpful comments and stimulating discussions on this paper and related topics. The author gratefully acknowledges funding from the European Research Council (the ERC-2013-CoG project REINS, no. 616512, and the ERC-2017-CoG project SEA, no. 771074).
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press.
- game theory
- other-regarding preferences
- team reasoning