Core and pricing equilibria in combinatorial exchanges

Martin Bichler*, Stefan Waldherr

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review


We study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several objects. In a seminal paper Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) have shown that the efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem. The pricing equilibria introduced by them do not always fill out the core in a combinatorial exchange. We introduce a linear programming formulation where we can easily identify in the dual problem whether the core is empty, and for which the pricing equilibrium always coincides with the core when it is not empty.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)145-147
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2017
Externally publishedYes


  • Combinatorial auctions
  • Combinatorial exchanges
  • Core
  • Pricing equilibrium


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