Abstract
This chapter contributes to the discussion on the most suitable form of airport regulation by focusing on the impact of airline behavior and the international focus of airports on the choice of regulatory scheme. Different objectives are discussed (welfare maximization, rent control, or efficient production), and the chapter touches upon the question of high- or low-powered regulation as the most suitable method to achieve said objectives. Low-powered airport regulation potentially leaves the rents to airlines, and not necessarily the final consumers. High-powered regulation leaves the rents with the local airport rather than with the international airlines, which may be politically convenient. If airlines are active in competitive markets, low-powered regulation leaves rents to passengers, and if the majority of these passengers is foreign, this scheme may also not be politically feasible.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Economic Regulation of Urban and Regional Airports |
| Subtitle of host publication | Incentives, Efficiency and Benchmarking |
| Editors | P. Forsyth, J. Müller, H.M. Niemeier, E. Pels |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH |
| Chapter | 5 |
| Pages | 111-123 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9783031203411 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9783031203398 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2023 |
Publication series
| Name | Advances in Spatial Science |
|---|---|
| ISSN (Print) | 1430-9602 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 2197-9375 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2023, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
Keywords
- Double marginalization
- Incentive regulation
- Policy competition
- Price-cap regulation
- Rate-of return regulation