Court-curbing through legal reforms or coercion?

In the past few decades, the world has witnessed various examples wherein elected authoritarian leaders curtailed the judiciary’s power by legal reforms and coercion mechanisms. Although in the literature there are different explanations about why and how the leaders restrict the power and independence of the judiciary, we do not know much about the contextual factors that affect their decision to use different types of court-curbing mechanisms. This chapter aims to provide a theoretical framework that explains the political and social conditions under which the leaders use formal legal reforms and the conditions under which they use coercion mechanisms for court-curbing. Using Turkey as a case study, the court-curbing mechanisms used by the AKP government (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party) and the contextual framework under which these mechanisms were used are critically analyzed. The analysis shows that elected authoritarian leaders usually prefer to use formal legal means to curtail the power of the judiciary. But when there is an imminent threat against the government and when the potential for public backlash is low, coercion mechanisms of court-curbing are preferred. The study asserts that the potential of public backlash would be low if the majority of citizens are not capable or willing to punish the government. While low public awareness and transparency affect citizens’ capability, the authoritarian political culture, clientelistic networks, and high political polarization affect citizens’ willingness to punish the ruling government.