Crime pays if you are just an average hacker

W. Shim, L. Allodi, F. Massacci

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This study investigates the effects of incentive and deterrence strategies that might turn a security researcher into a malware writer, or vice versa. By using a simple game theoretic model, we illustrate how hackers maximize their expected utility. Furthermore, our simulation models show how hackers' malicious activities are affected by changes in strategies employed by defenders. Our results indicate that, despite the manipulation of strategies, average-skilled hackers have incentives to participate in malicious activities, whereas highly skilled hackers who have high probability of getting maximum payoffs from legal activities are more likely to participate in legitimate ones. Lastly, according on our findings, reactive strategies are more effective than proactive strategies in discouraging hackers' malicious activities. © 2012 IEEE.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2012 ASE International Conference on Cyber Security, CyberSecurity 2012
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages62-68
ISBN (Print)9780769550145
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes
Event2012 ASE International Conference on Cyber Security, CyberSecurity 2012 - , United States
Duration: 14 Dec 201216 Dec 2012

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 2012 ASE International Conference on Cyber Security, CyberSecurity 2012

Conference

Conference2012 ASE International Conference on Cyber Security, CyberSecurity 2012
Country/TerritoryUnited States
Period14/12/1216/12/12

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Crime pays if you are just an average hacker'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this