Criteria for empirical theories of consciousness should focus on the explanatory power of mechanisms, not on functional equivalence

J.J. Fahrenfort, S. van Gaal

Research output: Contribution to JournalComment / Letter to the editorAcademic

Abstract

© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.Doerig and colleagues put forward the notion that we need hard and theory-neutral criteria by which to arbitrate between empirical (mechanistic) theories of consciousness. However, most of the criteria that they propose are not theory neutral because they focus on functional equivalence between systems. Because empirical theories of consciousness are mechanistic rather than functionalist, we think these criteria are not helpful when arbitrating between them.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)93-94
JournalCognitive Neuroscience
Volume12
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021

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