Das intentionale Objekt als Unding: Intentionalität ohne Gegenstände

Translated title of the contribution: The intentional object as absurditiy: Intentionality without objects

Carlo Ierna*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

The so-called “intentional object” occupies a central position in the debates about intentionality in Brentano and the Brentano School. How does it relate to the correlate, the content, or the intended, possibly external, transcendent object? Does it perhaps even coincide with one of these? There was no clear consensus on this neither in Brentano's time nor today. In order to develop a new perspective on the problem of the intentional object, I would like to introduce a deliberately radical interpretation and related terminological change: what if we were to avoid any talk of “object” in this context altogether? Perhaps this could help avoid the ambiguities and misunderstandings associated with talk of “intentional objects.” In my contribution I would like to sketch such an interpretation and consider whether this attempt could be useful to reframe the debate.

Translated title of the contributionThe intentional object as absurditiy: Intentionality without objects
Original languageGerman
Pages (from-to)113-130
Number of pages18
JournalGrazer Philosophische Studien
Volume100
Issue number1-2
Early online date26 May 2023
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2023
EventIntentionale Inexistenz bei Brentano neu interpretiert - Salzburg, Austria
Duration: 16 Jun 202218 Jun 2022
https://brentano2022.webnode.page

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Carlo Ierna, 2023.

Keywords

  • Franz Brentano
  • intentionale Gegenstände
  • intentionalität

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