Abstract
The so-called “intentional object” occupies a central position in the debates about intentionality in Brentano and the Brentano School. How does it relate to the correlate, the content, or the intended, possibly external, transcendent object? Does it perhaps even coincide with one of these? There was no clear consensus on this neither in Brentano's time nor today. In order to develop a new perspective on the problem of the intentional object, I would like to introduce a deliberately radical interpretation and related terminological change: what if we were to avoid any talk of “object” in this context altogether? Perhaps this could help avoid the ambiguities and misunderstandings associated with talk of “intentional objects.” In my contribution I would like to sketch such an interpretation and consider whether this attempt could be useful to reframe the debate.
Translated title of the contribution | The intentional object as absurditiy: Intentionality without objects |
---|---|
Original language | German |
Pages (from-to) | 113-130 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Grazer Philosophische Studien |
Volume | 100 |
Issue number | 1-2 |
Early online date | 26 May 2023 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - May 2023 |
Event | Intentionale Inexistenz bei Brentano neu interpretiert - Salzburg, Austria Duration: 16 Jun 2022 → 18 Jun 2022 https://brentano2022.webnode.page |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© Carlo Ierna, 2023.
Keywords
- Franz Brentano
- intentionale Gegenstände
- intentionalität