Abstract
Buses are the mainstay of public transport systems in many cities but are typically subject to significant delays due to traffic congestion. We examine the welfare effects of providing dedicated bus lanes in the city of Rome, Italy. We demonstrate that a dedicated bus lane reduces bus travel time by about 18 percent. Our welfare analysis focuses on the situation where mixed road lanes are turned into dedicated bus lanes. We find that bus lanes are undersupplied, despite the additional time costs due to reducing road capacity available to cars.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 298-310 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Transportation Research. Part A, Policy and Practice |
| Volume | 160 |
| Early online date | 28 Apr 2022 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:We thank Rome’s Mobility Agency (Agenzia per la Mobilita) and the Italian regulator for public sector strikes (Commissione di Garanzia per gli Scioperi) for kindly providing data. We would like to thank two anonymous referees, traffic lights Alex Anas, Richard Arnott, Pierre-Philippe Combes, Gilles Duranton, Dan Jaqua, Ismir Mulalic, Luis Rizzi, Chris Severen, Ken Small and Erik Verhoef for insightful comments. We are grateful to audiences at UC Irvine, University of Toronto, Newcastle University, London School of Economics, VU Amsterdam, Brno University of Technology, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Danish Technical University, GATE Lyon, PUC Santiago, University of Tokyo, the UEA meeting in Minneapolis, the IIPF conference in Lake Tahoe, the International Trade and Urban Economics workshop in St Petersburg, the Verkehrsökonomik und –politik Conference in Berlin and the meeting of the Italian Society for Transport Economics. All errors are our responsibility. We acknowledge financial contribution by the European Research Council-OPTION program.
Funding Information:
We thank Rome's Mobility Agency (Agenzia per la Mobilita) and the Italian regulator for public sector strikes (Commissione di Garanzia per gli Scioperi) for kindly providing data. We would like to thank two anonymous referees, traffic lights Alex Anas, Richard Arnott, Pierre-Philippe Combes, Gilles Duranton, Dan Jaqua, Ismir Mulalic, Luis Rizzi, Chris Severen, Ken Small and Erik Verhoef for insightful comments. We are grateful to audiences at UC Irvine, University of Toronto, Newcastle University, London School of Economics, VU Amsterdam, Brno University of Technology, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Danish Technical University, GATE Lyon, PUC Santiago, University of Tokyo, the UEA meeting in Minneapolis, the IIPF conference in Lake Tahoe, the International Trade and Urban Economics workshop in St Petersburg, the Verkehrs?konomik und ?politik Conference in Berlin and the meeting of the Italian Society for Transport Economics. All errors are our responsibility. We acknowledge financial contribution by the European Research Council-OPTION program.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022
Funding
We thank Rome’s Mobility Agency (Agenzia per la Mobilita) and the Italian regulator for public sector strikes (Commissione di Garanzia per gli Scioperi) for kindly providing data. We would like to thank two anonymous referees, traffic lights Alex Anas, Richard Arnott, Pierre-Philippe Combes, Gilles Duranton, Dan Jaqua, Ismir Mulalic, Luis Rizzi, Chris Severen, Ken Small and Erik Verhoef for insightful comments. We are grateful to audiences at UC Irvine, University of Toronto, Newcastle University, London School of Economics, VU Amsterdam, Brno University of Technology, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Danish Technical University, GATE Lyon, PUC Santiago, University of Tokyo, the UEA meeting in Minneapolis, the IIPF conference in Lake Tahoe, the International Trade and Urban Economics workshop in St Petersburg, the Verkehrsökonomik und –politik Conference in Berlin and the meeting of the Italian Society for Transport Economics. All errors are our responsibility. We acknowledge financial contribution by the European Research Council-OPTION program. We thank Rome's Mobility Agency (Agenzia per la Mobilita) and the Italian regulator for public sector strikes (Commissione di Garanzia per gli Scioperi) for kindly providing data. We would like to thank two anonymous referees, traffic lights Alex Anas, Richard Arnott, Pierre-Philippe Combes, Gilles Duranton, Dan Jaqua, Ismir Mulalic, Luis Rizzi, Chris Severen, Ken Small and Erik Verhoef for insightful comments. We are grateful to audiences at UC Irvine, University of Toronto, Newcastle University, London School of Economics, VU Amsterdam, Brno University of Technology, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Danish Technical University, GATE Lyon, PUC Santiago, University of Tokyo, the UEA meeting in Minneapolis, the IIPF conference in Lake Tahoe, the International Trade and Urban Economics workshop in St Petersburg, the Verkehrs?konomik und ?politik Conference in Berlin and the meeting of the Italian Society for Transport Economics. All errors are our responsibility. We acknowledge financial contribution by the European Research Council-OPTION program.
Keywords
- Bus lanes
- Congestion
- Public transit
