Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement

Chris Ranalli; Thirza Lagewaard

doi:10.1111/phc3.12886

Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement

Chris Ranalli^*, Thirza Lagewaard

^*Corresponding author for this work

Epistemology and Metaphysics

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

Some disagreements concern our most fundamental beliefs, principles, values, or worldviews, such as those about the existence of God, society and politics, or the trustworthiness of science. These are ‘deep disagreements’. But what exactly are deep disagreements? This paper critically overviews theories of deep disagreement. It does three things. First, it explains the differences between deep and other kinds of disagreement, including peer, persistent, and widespread disagreement. Second, it critically overviews two mainstream theories of deep disagreement, the Wittgensteinian account and the Fundamental Epistemic Principle account, before introducing a Hybrid account. Finally, it explores the notion that deep disagreements can be deeper than others.

Original language	English
Article number	e12886
Pages (from-to)	1-18
Number of pages	18
Journal	Philosophy Compass
Volume	17
Issue number	12
Early online date	26 Oct 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12886
Publication status	Published - Dec 2022

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We'd like to thank an anonymous reviewer of for their extremely helpful feedback. Finally, we thank the Editor Alex Guerrero and Area Editor Daniel Greco for their support. Work on this article was made possible by project EXTREME (Extreme Beliefs: The Epistemology and Ethics of Fundamentalism), which has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (Grant agreement No. 851613) and from the Dutch Research Council (NWO) (Grant Number 276‐20‐024). Philosophy Compass Philosophy Compass

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 The Authors. Philosophy Compass published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Funding

We'd like to thank an anonymous reviewer of for their extremely helpful feedback. Finally, we thank the Editor Alex Guerrero and Area Editor Daniel Greco for their support. Work on this article was made possible by project EXTREME (Extreme Beliefs: The Epistemology and Ethics of Fundamentalism), which has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (Grant agreement No. 851613) and from the Dutch Research Council (NWO) (Grant Number 276‐20‐024). Philosophy Compass Philosophy Compass

Funders	Funder number
Philosophy Compass Philosophy Compass
Horizon 2020 Framework Programme
European Research Council
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek	276‐20‐024
Horizon 2020	851613

Keywords

Deep disagreement
Worldviews
Fundamental principles

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1111/phc3.12886

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Cite this

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abstract = "Some disagreements concern our most fundamental beliefs, principles, values, or worldviews, such as those about the existence of God, society and politics, or the trustworthiness of science. These are {\textquoteleft}deep disagreements{\textquoteright}. But what exactly are deep disagreements? This paper critically overviews theories of deep disagreement. It does three things. First, it explains the differences between deep and other kinds of disagreement, including peer, persistent, and widespread disagreement. Second, it critically overviews two mainstream theories of deep disagreement, the Wittgensteinian account and the Fundamental Epistemic Principle account, before introducing a Hybrid account. Finally, it explores the notion that deep disagreements can be deeper than others.",

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Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

UN SDGs

Access to Document

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