Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement

Chris Ranalli; Thirza Lagewaard

doi:10.1111/phc3.12887

Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement

Chris Ranalli^*, Thirza Lagewaard

^*Corresponding author for this work

Epistemology and Metaphysics

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

What is the epistemological significance of deep disagreement? Part I explored the nature of deep disagreement, while Part II considers its epistemological significance. It focuses on two core problems: the incommensurability and the rational resolvability problems. We critically survey key responses to these challenges, before raising worries for a variety of responses to them, including skeptical, relativist, and absolutist responses to the incommensurability problem, and to certain steadfast and conciliatory responses to the rational resolvability problem. We then pivot to the ethical and political dimensions of deep disagreement. We focus on whether an unwillingness to engage with positions one considers to be immoral or repugnant might be good, and conclude with some reflections on the moral risks of engagement.

Original language	English
Article number	e12887
Pages (from-to)	1-14
Number of pages	14
Journal	Philosophy Compass
Volume	17
Issue number	12
Early online date	26 Oct 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12887
Publication status	Published - Dec 2022

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We sincerely thank the anonymous referees of Philosophy Compass for their helpful feedback. We also thank the Editor‐in‐Chief of Philosophy Compass, Alex Guerrero, and the area editor, Daniel Greco, for their support. Work on this paper was made possible by the project EXTREME (Extreme Beliefs: The Epistemology and Ethics of Fundamentalism), funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (Grant agreement No. 851613).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 The Authors. Philosophy Compass published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Funding

We sincerely thank the anonymous referees of Philosophy Compass for their helpful feedback. We also thank the Editor‐in‐Chief of Philosophy Compass, Alex Guerrero, and the area editor, Daniel Greco, for their support. Work on this paper was made possible by the project EXTREME (Extreme Beliefs: The Epistemology and Ethics of Fundamentalism), funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (Grant agreement No. 851613).

Funders	Funder number
Horizon 2020 Framework Programme
European Research Council
Horizon 2020	851613

Keywords

Deep disagreement
Incommensurability
Concilliatory views
Steadfast views
Arationality
Repugnant beliefs

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1111/phc3.12887

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abstract = "What is the epistemological significance of deep disagreement? Part I explored the nature of deep disagreement, while Part II considers its epistemological significance. It focuses on two core problems: the incommensurability and the rational resolvability problems. We critically survey key responses to these challenges, before raising worries for a variety of responses to them, including skeptical, relativist, and absolutist responses to the incommensurability problem, and to certain steadfast and conciliatory responses to the rational resolvability problem. We then pivot to the ethical and political dimensions of deep disagreement. We focus on whether an unwillingness to engage with positions one considers to be immoral or repugnant might be good, and conclude with some reflections on the moral risks of engagement.",

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Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

UN SDGs

Access to Document

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