Deregulation and welfare in airline markets: An analysis of frequency equilibria

J.Y. Schipper, P. Nijkamp, P. Rietveld

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This paper models airline competition as a two-stage game in frequency and prices, allowing for asymmetric frequency equilibria. The approach follows the spatial multiproduct oligopoly literature. The dynamic structure gives airlines an incentive to choose asymmetric frequency equilibria such that price competition is reduced. This feature is most pronounced in the case of inelastic demand, for which a maximum differentiation result is derived. We apply the model in a simulation study of airline deregulation of the Amsterdam-Maastricht market in The Netherlands, calculating welfare effects for various types of p © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)194-206
Number of pages13
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume178
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2007

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Deregulation and welfare in airline markets: An analysis of frequency equilibria'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this