Abstract
Criminal law and economics rests on the expectation that deterrence incentives can be employed to reduce crime. Prison survey evidence however suggests that a majority of criminals are biased and may not react to deterrence incentives. This study employs an extra-laboratory experiment with criminals in a German prison to test the effectiveness of deterrence and compares it with data of student subjects. Subjects either face potential punishment when stealing, or they can steal without deterrence. We confirm Gary Becker’s deterrence hypothesis that deterrence works for criminals (and similarly for students). We observe significantly more risk-seeking criminals than students, although the vast majority (80.77 %) of criminals behaves risk-neutral or risk-averse.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 165-178 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | European Journal of Law and Economics |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Aug 2018 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Funding
I am grateful to the JVA f?r Frauen in Vechta and especially Petra Huckemeyer and Elsbeth L?bbe for their dedicated cooperation and to the Kriminologischer Dienst in Lower Saxony for its permission to conduct this study. Funding and guidance for this experiment was provided by the chair of Andreas Lange at the University of Hamburg. Sarah M?rtenhuber and Jan Papmeier provided excellent research assistance.?I thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments.
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| JVA für Frauen in Vechta | |
| Universität Hamburg |
Keywords
- Crime
- Deterrence
- Inmates
- Prison
- Risk
- Stealing