Dispersed initial ownership and th eefficiency of the stock market under moral hazard

R. Calcagno, W Wagner

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademic

Abstract

We generalize a standard general equilibrium framework extended for moral hazard to allow for a dispersed initial ownership distribution of firms. We show that the market allocation is constrained-efficient only when in each firm the entrepreneur who generates payoffs through nobservable effort has full initial ownership in his firm. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)36-45
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume42
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Dispersed initial ownership and th eefficiency of the stock market under moral hazard'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this