Dispersed initial ownership and th eefficiency of the stock market under moral hazard

R. Calcagno; W Wagner

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.11.003

Dispersed initial ownership and th eefficiency of the stock market under moral hazard

R. Calcagno
, W Wagner

Finance

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic

Abstract

We generalize a standard general equilibrium framework extended for moral hazard to allow for a dispersed initial ownership distribution of firms. We show that the market allocation is constrained-efficient only when in each firm the entrepreneur who generates payoffs through nobservable effort has full initial ownership in his firm. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	36-45
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	42
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.11.003
Publication status	Published - 2006

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.11.003

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Cite this

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abstract = "We generalize a standard general equilibrium framework extended for moral hazard to allow for a dispersed initial ownership distribution of firms. We show that the market allocation is constrained-efficient only when in each firm the entrepreneur who generates payoffs through nobservable effort has full initial ownership in his firm. {\textcopyright} 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.",

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AB - We generalize a standard general equilibrium framework extended for moral hazard to allow for a dispersed initial ownership distribution of firms. We show that the market allocation is constrained-efficient only when in each firm the entrepreneur who generates payoffs through nobservable effort has full initial ownership in his firm. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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