Distance-based equilibria in normal-form games

Erman Acar, Reshef Meir

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We propose a simple uncertainty modification for the agent model in normal-form games; at any given strategy profile, the agent can access only a set of “possible profiles” that are within a certain distance from the actual action profile. We investigate the various instantiations in which the agent chooses her strategy using well-known rationales e.g., considering the worst case, or trying to minimize the regret, to cope with such uncertainty. Any such modification in the behavioral model naturally induces a corresponding notion of equilibrium; a distance-based equilibrium. We characterize the relationships between the various equilibria, and also their connections to well-known existing solution concepts such as Trembling-hand perfection. Furthermore, we deliver existence results, and show that for some class of games, such solution concepts can actually lead to better outcomes.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence [2020]
PublisherAAAI Press
Pages1750-1757
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781577358350
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 3 Apr 2020
Event34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2020 - New York, United States
Duration: 7 Feb 202012 Feb 2020

Publication series

NameProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Number2
Volume34
ISSN (Print)2159-5399

Conference

Conference34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2020
CountryUnited States
CityNew York
Period7/02/2012/02/20

Bibliographical note

Conference issue: AAAI-20 Technical Tracks 2, section: AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms.

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Distance-based equilibria in normal-form games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this