Does price fixing benefit corporate managers?

Tanja Artiga González, Markus Schmid, David Yermack

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We study the effects of cartel participation on top corporate managers. Although a strong public interest exists in regulating price fixing, we find little evidence that either corporate governance or the legal system holds managers of cartel firms accountable. Instead, managers of cartel firms enjoy greater job security, receive higher cash bonuses, and more aggressively take profits from appreciated stock option awards. Legal sanctions against individual managers are infrequent, with enforcement actions focused on corporations rather than their officers. Managers seem to use concealment strategies actively to limit detection of cartel membership by their boards and auditors.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)4813-4840
Number of pages28
JournalManagement Science
Volume65
Issue number10
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2019

Keywords

  • Cartels
  • Corporate governance
  • Executive compensation
  • Price fixing

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