TY - JOUR
T1 - Does the Brain ‘Initiate’ Freely Willed Processes? A Philosophy of Science Critique of Libet-Type Experiments and Their Interpretation
AU - Radder, H.
AU - Meynen, G.
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - In the extensive, recent debates on free will, the pioneering experiments by Benjamin Libet continue to play a significant role. It is often claimed that these experiments demonstrate the illusory nature of freely willed actions. In this article, we provide a detailed analysis and evaluation of Libet—s experiments from a philosophy of science perspective. Our analysis focuses on Libet—s central notion of the “initiation” of freely willed processes by the brain. We examine four interpretations of the notion of initiation: in terms of a cause, a necessary condition, a correlation, and a regular succession. We argue that none of these four interpretations can be supported by the design and results of Libet—s experiments. In addition, we analyze two recent Libet-type experiments. Our general conclusion is that neither Libet—s original experiments nor later Libet-type experiments can justify the claim that allegedly freely willed processes are in fact initiated by the brain. © 2012, SAGE Publications. All rights reserved.
AB - In the extensive, recent debates on free will, the pioneering experiments by Benjamin Libet continue to play a significant role. It is often claimed that these experiments demonstrate the illusory nature of freely willed actions. In this article, we provide a detailed analysis and evaluation of Libet—s experiments from a philosophy of science perspective. Our analysis focuses on Libet—s central notion of the “initiation” of freely willed processes by the brain. We examine four interpretations of the notion of initiation: in terms of a cause, a necessary condition, a correlation, and a regular succession. We argue that none of these four interpretations can be supported by the design and results of Libet—s experiments. In addition, we analyze two recent Libet-type experiments. Our general conclusion is that neither Libet—s original experiments nor later Libet-type experiments can justify the claim that allegedly freely willed processes are in fact initiated by the brain. © 2012, SAGE Publications. All rights reserved.
U2 - 10.1177/0959354312460926
DO - 10.1177/0959354312460926
M3 - Article
SN - 0959-3543
VL - 23
SP - 3
EP - 21
JO - Theory and Psychology
JF - Theory and Psychology
IS - 1
ER -