Doing good or doing harm: experimental evidence on giving and taking in public good games

Menusch Khadjavi, Andreas Lange*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We replicate Andreoni (Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 1–21, 1995)’s finding that agents behave more selfishly when taking from a public account than when giving to a public good. Based on a neutral language setting we add new insights into motivations to give or take in a linear public good setting: we find that Andreoni’s result is partly driven by the complete elimination of giving options in the taking frame. However, a pure extension of the action space into the taking domain also leads to a significant increase in selfish behavior.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)432-441
Number of pages10
JournalExperimental Economics
Volume18
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 11 Sep 2015
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Experiments
  • Public good
  • Taking
  • Voluntary provision

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