Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: The effect of admission selectivity

Ran I. Shorrer; Sándor Sóvágó

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.002

Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: The effect of admission selectivity

Ran I. Shorrer
, Sándor Sóvágó

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

College applicants often make dominated choices even when a strategically simple mechanism such as deferred acceptance is in place. We study Hungarian college admissions, where deferred acceptance is used, and still many college applicants make revealed dominated choices: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver. Using two empirical strategies, we show that when admission with a tuition waiver becomes more selective, applicants make more revealed dominated choices. Our results suggest that dominated choices respond to economic incentives.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	167-182
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	144
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.002
Publication status	Published - 1 Mar 2024
Externally published	Yes

Funding

A previous version of this paper circulated under the title “Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College Admissions Environment: Causes and Consequences.” This work was supported by the United States - Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF grants 2016015 and 2022417 ). The Hungarian Higher Education Application Database (FELVI) is owned by the Hungarian Education Bureau (Oktatási Hivatal). The data were processed by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HAS-CERS). A previous version of this paper circulated under the title “Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College Admissions Environment: Causes and Consequences.” This work was supported by the United States - Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF grants 2016015 and 2022417). The Hungarian Higher Education Application Database (FELVI) is owned by the Hungarian Education Bureau (Oktatási Hivatal). The data were processed by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HAS-CERS).

Funders	Funder number
Hungarian Education Bureau
Bloom's Syndrome Foundation	2022417, 2016015
United States - Israel Binational Science Foundation
Magyar Tudományos Akadémia

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abstract = "College applicants often make dominated choices even when a strategically simple mechanism such as deferred acceptance is in place. We study Hungarian college admissions, where deferred acceptance is used, and still many college applicants make revealed dominated choices: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver. Using two empirical strategies, we show that when admission with a tuition waiver becomes more selective, applicants make more revealed dominated choices. Our results suggest that dominated choices respond to economic incentives.",

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Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: The effect of admission selectivity

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